This is a topic of interest that will support my research into solving environmental conflicts. When looking at environmental conflicts, there is a stream of literature that focuses on the concept of “intractability” and its root causes. This article identifies key characteristics of intractable environmental disputes and the role of framing in understanding, resolving, and making them more tractable.
Definition of Intractability
The Oxford Dictionary defines tractable as something that is “easy to deal with” (derived from the Latin tractare, “to handle”), and intractable as “hard to control or deal with.” Lewicki, et al., (2003) and Asah, et al., (2012) define intractable conflicts as those that are long-standing and elude resolution, and they refer to intractability in terms of a continuum. On one side is problem solving, where the parties have sufficient common ground to completely resolve the matter. On the other extreme is intractability, where parties have no common ground so the matter eludes resolution on a long-standing basis. In the middle are tractable disputes, where the parties have potential points of integration that may enable them to resolve the matter, despite ongoing divergent interests and incompatible goals. Later I will refer to this as satisficing.
The authors note that, because of their dynamic nature, at any one point in time an environmental dispute can be at any point on the continuum. The dynamic nature comes from the fact that intractability is driven by the perceptions of the parties to the dispute, and those perceptions can - and will - change over time. By this formulation, the objective of conflict resolution would be to turn intractable disputes into tractable ones.
The Role of Framing
In the literature intractability is inextricably paired with framing analysis. The former gives the analysis dimension, and the latter helps codify human behaviour. A discussion of the characteristics of intractability is not complete without an understanding of framing.
“A frame reflects our interpretation of what is going on and how we see ourselves and others implicated in what is happening,” and “framing enables us to locate ourselves with respect to that experience. Through framing, we place ourselves in relation to the issues or events - that is, we take a stance with respect to them… (Lewicki, et al., 2003, p. 12).”
Intractability is the result of a mismatch of stakeholder frames, and the key to resolving that conflict is to have the participants in the dispute reframe their perceptions surrounding the conflict. (Lewicki, et al., 2003; Gray, 2004; Asah, et al., 2012).
In 2003 Environmental Practice ran a special issue devoted to framing and intractability, which provides an excellent summation of the two combined topics. Authors involved in the edition of this issue agreed on the following seven frames as they relate to intractable environmental conflicts (Davis & Lewicki, 2003):
1. Identity Frames: These refer to how parties in a dispute chose to self-identify. How a person or organization characterized herself in a conflict will strongly influence how they behave and interpret information.
2. Characterization Frames: These are identity frames that participants make about others and their perceived beliefs and values; the counterpart to identity frames.
3. Conflict Management Frames: These refer to preferences for how conflicts should be managed. Given the highly procedural nature of environmental disputes, this is not trivial.
4. Fact-Finding Frames: These refer to the way technical information is perceived by disputants, including experts and non-experts. See also Kaufman, et al. (2003).
5. Social Control Frames: These refer to how decisions regarding social issues should be made, and there are two dimensions: Degree of collective ownership over the decision, and degree of dependency on external parties, like experts, for decisions.
6. Power Frames: These explore the dynamic of power between disputants.
7. Risk Frames: These refer to the perception of risk around costs, gains or losses, benefits, advantages, etc. among disputants.
Philosophy of Framing
Framing analysis has a rich and diverse history, and a clarification of the underlying philosophy of framing for my research will be important. Dewulf, et al., (2005) codify the ontological, theoretical and epistemological underpinning between different approaches to framing research. Their analysis systemizes two disparate approaches previously conflated in the environmental framing literature: interactional and cognitive. The interactional co-construction approach views frames as the result of ongoing communication between parties, i.e. a phenomenon of the interaction. The cognitive approach, building on Minksy (1975), approaches frames as mental models and examines the way individuals process information, and is consistent with prospect theory and most decision-making literature.
Asah, et al., (2012) prefer not to choose between the two philosophies. The authors pick up from DeWulf et. al. (2009), and offer an example of the use of Q Methodology to clarify disputant frames and to also encourage participant interaction. They find the distinction between cognitive and interactional problematic because both have limitations that can and should be overcome. This could serve to bridge the gap between passive frame identification and positive mutual reinforcement between parties, and it will provide support for the theoretical framework of my analysis.
Conclusions
For the purposes of my research I will refer to the seven frames identified above. My inquiry of examining the ability of prospect theory to drive reframing is inherently cognitive in approach, so I will use the cognitive ontological and epistemological approach to framing. My expectation is that Asah, et al.’s (2012) assertion that Q Methodology, or a similar recursive communication process, can bridge the cognitive and interactional approach to framing will be directly relevant to my analysis.
References
Asah, S. T., Bengston, D. N., Wendt, K., & Nelson, K. C. (2012). Diagnostic reframing of intractable environmental problems: case of a contested multiparty public land-use conflict. Journal of environmental management, 108, 108–19.
Davis, C. B., & Lewicki, R. J. (2003). Environmental Conflict Resolution: Framing and Intractability. Environmental Practice, 5(3), 200–206.
Dewulf, A., Gray, B., Putnam, L., Aarts, N., Lewicki, R., Bouwen, R., & Van Woerkum, C. (2005). Disentangling approaches to framing: mapping the terrain. IACM 18th Annual
Gray, B. (2004). Strong Opposition: Frame-based Resistance to Collaboration. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 176(February), 166–176.
Kaufman, S., Gardner, R., & Burgess, G. (2003). Just the Facts, Please: Framing and Technical Information. Environmental Practice, 5(03), 223–231.
Lewicki, R. J., & Gray, B. (2003). Introduction: Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts. In R. J. Lewicki, B. Gray, & M. Elliott (Eds.), Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts (First., pp. 1–10). Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. WInston (Ed.), The Psychology of Computer Vision (1st ed., pp. 211–77). New York: McGraw-Hill.